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HOW TARHAQA ALLEN V. NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT JUMPED THE GUN 
BY LIMITING PROTECTIVE SEARCHES TO 
OUTER CLOTHING 
ANNE MARIE ESPOSITO† 
“What does a fatal shoot-out look like?  It’s very quick.  A 
man pulls out a gun and shoots another man, dead—before either 
has time to think, let alone talk, negotiate, argue, confess, 
pontificate or repent.”1  It is every police officer’s worst 
nightmare and rightfully so.  Last year, gunshots caused more 
than one-third of American police officer deaths.2  But police 
officers are not entirely without protection.  Since 1968, the 
Supreme Court has sanctioned protective searches, which allow 
an officer to conduct an initial search for weapons when dealing 
with an armed and dangerous suspect.3   
Recently, in Tarhaqa Allen v. N.Y.C. Police Department,4 the 
Southern District of New York limited protective searches to 
outer clothing.5  Under this holding, an officer is unable to search 
a bag or backpack within the suspect’s reach, even if the officer 
believes that the bag contains a deadly weapon.6  In Tarhaqa 
Allen, however, the Southern District misinterpreted Terry v. 
Ohio, which merely requires that a protective search be 
reasonable and not that the search be limited to outer clothing.7  
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s School 
of Law; B.A., St. John’s University, 2008. 
1 Virginia Heffernan, Cop Shot, N.Y. TIMES MEDIUM BLOG (June 29, 2007, 2:22 
PM), http://themedium.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/cop-shot/. 
2 162 American police officers were killed in 2010 and fifty-nine of those deaths 
were caused by gunshots. Honoring Officers Killed in the Year 2010, THE OFFICE 
DOWN MEMORIAL PAGE, INC., http://www.odmp.org/year.php (last visited Jan. 12, 
2011). Forty-seven officers were killed by gunshots in 2009. Id. 
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
4 No. 07 Civ. 8682(RPP), 2010 WL 1790429 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2010). 
5 See id. at *7. 
6 See id. (“Officer Gonzalez’s search of Allen’s bag exceeded the scope of Terry 
pat-down which is limited to outer clothing.”). 
7 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29–30. 
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The holding in Tarhaqa Allen is also inconsistent with the 
fundamental policy underlying Terry: police officer and public 
protection.8  Therefore, a police officer should be permitted to 
search a bag or backpack, provided the officer: (1) reasonably 
believes the suspect is armed and dangerous; (2) has reasonable 
suspicion to stop the suspect; and (3) does not exceed the scope of 
the search.9  
In Tarhaqa Allen, the plaintiff, Allen, entered a housing 
development without a key and without signing the guest sheet 
in the lobby.10  A sign posted on the building warned trespassers 
that they would be subject to arrest.11  Three police officers—
Officers Gonzalez, Ruiz, and Figuereo—stopped Allen as he 
attempted to leave the building.12  Gonzalez asked Allen for 
identification and discovered that Allen did not live at that 
address.13  Allen explained that he was dropping off a package at 
his sister-in-law’s apartment, 8-B.14  Figuereo went up to the 
apartment to verify his story, but Allen’s sister-in-law was asleep 
and did not answer the door.15  When Figuereo returned, the 
officers accompanied Allen upstairs and knocked on the door 
again.16  Still, no one answered.17  Gonzalez asked Allen what 
was in his bag and looked inside it but did not see a weapon.18  
Figuereo patted down Allen’s pants, searched his pockets, and 
removed his keys.19  At this point, Allen’s brother-in-law arrived 
at the apartment but could not identify Allen.20  Suspicious of 
Allen’s story, Figuereo used Allen’s keys to unlock the apartment 
door.21  When the keys worked, Figuereo told Allen that he was 
free to go.22   
 
8 See id. at 29. 
9 See id. at 30–31. 
10 2010 WL 1790429, at *1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *2. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *1–2. 





20 Id. at *3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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Even though Allen was not arrested, he sued the police 
department, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.23  Specifically, Allen claimed that the officers 
should not have searched his bag.24  The district court found that 
police officers can search a suspect for a weapon if the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous, but 
the search is limited to outer clothing.25  The court quoted Terry, 
upholding a “carefully limited search of the outer clothing . . . in 
an attempt to discover weapons.”26  Since Allen’s bag was not 
outer clothing, the search therefore “exceeded the permissible 
scope of a Terry stop.”27  Nonetheless, the court granted 
defendant’s summary judgment motion on the grounds of 
qualified immunity.28  
On June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court rendered two leading 
decisions on this issue: Terry v. Ohio29 and Sibron v. New York.30  
In Terry, the Court found a protective search constitutional 
because the officer patted down the suspect’s outer clothing 
before he removed a weapon from the suspect’s pockets.31  The 
officers acted with reasonable suspicion and conducted a search 
“confined in scope [and] . . . reasonably designed to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the 
police officer.”32  The Court emphasized that reasonableness in 
each case would depend on the particular facts but upheld that 
specific search because it only involved a limited search of outer 
clothing.33  On the other hand, in Sibron, the Court found a pants 





23 Id. at *4. 
24 See id. at *2, *7. 
25 Id. at *7. 
26 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
27 Id. 
28 See id. at *9. 
29 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
30 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
31 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29–30. 
32 Id. at 29. 
33 Id. at 30. 
34 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65. 
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reasonable suspicion to search the suspect,35 and the officer did 
not conduct a limited pat-down search before thrusting his hand 
into the suspect’s pocket.36   
The argument that an investigative stop is limited to outer 
clothing is relatively new.  Only one 2010 Pennsylvania District 
Court agrees with Tarhaqa Allen.37  The Ninth38 and Fourth39 
Circuits have both permitted backpack searches during an 
investigatory stop as long as the officers: (1) had reasonable 
suspicion to stop the suspect in the first place; (2) “ha[d] reason 
to believe that the suspect [was] armed and dangerous”; and 
(3) limited the search in scope to finding a weapon.40   
Terry held that a pat-down search limited to outer clothing is 
constitutional, but did not hold that protective searches are only 
limited to outer clothing.41  In Terry, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that it was only addressing an extremely narrow 
issue particular to the facts of the case42:  “The issue is not the 
abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility 
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and 
seizure.”43  The Court specifically stated that it was not going to 
outline the “constitutional limitations” of police conduct.44  In the 
sentence immediately preceding its holding, the Court cautioned 
 
35 Id. at 64. 
36 Id. at 65. 
37 See United States v. Bennett, No. 08-535, 2010 WL 1427593, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 8, 2010). The Pennsylvania District Court’s decision, however, is misguided. 
The court relied on the Supreme Court case Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 
(2000), in finding that the physical manipulation of a bag violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Bennett, 2010 WL 1427593, at *6. Bond, however, involved a border 
search, where the officers were verifying the citizenship status of passengers, and 
were not conducting a Terry stop. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 335. Therefore, a different 
standard applied and different government interests were at stake. 
38 See United States v. Medina, 130 F. App’x 862, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-4481, 2010 WL 2851760, at *5 (4th 
Cir. July 21, 2010). 
40 See Nash v. Vancouver Police Dep’t, No. C10-5055(RBL), 2010 WL 2720842, at 
*6 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2010) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). 
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
42 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (cautioning that it will only address “whether it is 
always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited 
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest”). 
43 Id. at 12.  
44 Id. at 16 (announcing that it would not “canvass in detail the constitutional 
limitations upon the scope of a policeman’s power when he confronts a citizen 
without probable cause to arrest him”). 
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that “[e]ach case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on 
its own facts.”45  Thus, the Court did not intend to establish a 
bright line rule but instead a more flexible case-by-case standard. 
Later Supreme Court cases are consistent with this 
interpretation.  For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that protective searches under Terry are “limited to 
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons” but did not 
mention the supposed “limited to outer clothing” requirement.46  
In 2000, the Supreme Court again emphasized that Terry 
requires a protective search to be reasonable but did not state 
that it must be limited to outer clothing.47  
Consequently, the court in Tarhaqa Allen misinterpreted 
Terry.  When the court in Tarhaqa Allen quoted Terry and stated 
that an officer can only conduct a “carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing,”48 the court was citing to a holding specific to the 
facts in Terry.  The court in Tarhaqa Allen should have merely 
construed Terry as an example of a reasonable protective search, 
not as a bright-line rule foreclosing the constitutionality of all 
other types of searches.  
The language in Sibron does not limit protective searches to 
outer clothing either.  In Sibron, the Court held that officers who 
reasonably believe a suspect is armed and dangerous must 
attempt “an initial limited exploration” of outer clothing such as 
a pat-down search before reaching into a suspect’s pockets.49  The 
Court in Sibron merely addressed the preliminary steps required 
before a pants pocket search may be conducted and not the 
boundaries of constitutional police conduct.50  In this context, by 
 
45 Id. at 30. 
46 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (“[A] protective search—
permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than 
probable cause—must be strictly ‘limited to that which is necessary for the discovery 
of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.’ ” (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26)). 
47 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 127 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part) (“We approved as well ‘a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of 
the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed 
and dangerous individual . . . .’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). 
48 Tarhaqa Allen v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 07 Civ. 8682, 2010 WL 1790429, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2010) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (emphasis added). 
49 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (contrasting with the search 
conducted in Terry). 
50 See, e.g., Nash v. Vancouver Police Dep’t, No. C10-5055RBL, 2010 WL 
2720842, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2010) (“Any limited intrusion designed to 
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requiring a pat-down search before a pocket search, the 
limitation on outer clothing prevents officers from immediately 
searching underneath clothing51 but not necessarily from 
searching backpacks or bags. 
Moreover, if an officer is allowed to search inside a suspect’s 
pants pockets, a backpack search will not make the search more 
intrusive.  In other contexts such as school searches, a pants 
pocket search is much more invasive than merely looking at the 
contents of someone’s backpack.52  If intrusive pocket searches 
are permitted under certain circumstances, why would a less 
intrusive backpack search be completely banned? 
Furthermore, limiting protective searches to outer clothing 
undermines the primary policy for allowing protective searches 
in the first place: “the protection of the police officer and others 
nearby.”53  Officers cannot provide meaningful protection if they 
are unable to search backpacks.54  A person carrying a weapon in 
a backpack can cause harm just as easily as a person carrying a 
 
discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault are permissible.” 
(quoting United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976))). 
51 See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65. 
52 See H.Y. v. Russell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1186 (M.D. Ala. 
2007) (“[Placing a hand in the Plaintiffs’ pockets is] clearly more intrusive 
than . . . merely looking through Plaintiffs’ book bags and purses or viewing the 
contents of their pockets.”). 
53 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (“The sole justification of the search in the present 
situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby . . . .”). 
Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify 
unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed 
criminals pose to public safety; Terry’s rule, which permits protective police 
searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that 
officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very 
concern. 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366, 373 (1993) (recognizing that “[t]he purpose of this limited search is not to 
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation 
without fear of violence” (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54 “[S]uspects may injure officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons 
even though they may not have a weapon on their person . . . .” United States v. 
Medina, 130 F. App’x 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a suspect can reach a 
weapon in a fanny pack). Some courts even argue that pat-down searches 
themselves are inadequate to protect police officers and the public in certain 
circumstances. See Nash, 2010 WL 2720842, at *7 (finding that an officer probably 
will not find bullets or a knife hidden in a pocket or sock and allowing a suspect to 
leave the stop with bullets to load into a nearby gun would certainly pose a threat to 
people in the area). 
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weapon on their person.55  An unrestrained suspect could just as 
quickly grab a weapon from a backpack within his immediate 
reach as he could grab a weapon from his pocket.56  Therefore, 
allowing police officers to search an easily accessible backpack is 
consistent with the policy underlying Terry.57 
Finally, permitting backpack searches will not allow officers 
to exercise unfettered discretion.  First, the search must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose of finding weapons and 
cannot be an exploratory search for contraband.58  For example, 
in Johnson v. County of Nassau, a Fourth Amendment claim 
survived a motion to dismiss where the officers, in search of a 
gun, removed a book from plaintiff’s backpack and flipped 
through its pages.59  Similarly, where the backpack had been 
taken away from a suspect and placed outside the suspect’s 
reach, courts have found that a backpack search is outside the 
scope of Terry.60  Second, the officer must have reasonable 
suspicion for the initial stop.61  In other words, “the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”62  Third, the officer must also 
“have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus 
presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was 
investigating his suspicious behavior.”63  Therefore, there are still 
several limitations in place.  
 
55 See Medina, 130 F. App’x at 864.  
56 See id. 
57 See id. (“Because suspects may injure officers and others by virtue of their 
access to weapons even though they may not have a weapon on their person, the 
physical scope of a Terry protective search is not limited to the detainee’s person.”). 
58 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29–30 (finding the search must “be confined in scope to 
an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden 
instruments for the assault of the police officer” and may not be a general 
exploratory search for contraband). 
59 Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau, 09-CV-4746(JS)(MLO), 2010 WL 3852032, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010) (“Taking these allegations together, it is plausible to infer 
that the officers were not searching for weapons when they searched Plaintiff’s bag 
and started ‘leafing’ through the pages of Plaintiff’s books.”). 
60 Compare United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding 
that “by the time [the officer] searched the backpack, it had already been taken 
away from [the suspect] and there was no apparent risk that [the suspect] could 
have obtained a weapon”), with Medina, 130 F. App’x at 864 (finding a fanny pack is 
more easily accessible to the suspect). 
61 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
62 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
63 Id. at 28. 
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A police officer’s most prominent duty is the protection of the 
public.  But this protection is meaningless if courts continue to 
restrict an officer’s conduct during protective searches.  
Prohibiting officers from searching backpacks puts the officer 
and the public at risk, especially when dealing with an armed 
and dangerous suspect.  Limiting protective searches to outer 
clothing undermines the fundamental policy of Terry and runs 
contrary to the Court’s requirement that each case be analyzed 
on its specific facts.  The only way police officers will be able to 
effectively protect the public and themselves is if they are fully 
able to exercise the protection provided for them under the 
Constitution.  
 
